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RESULTS OF THE "PROSPECTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
BULGARIAN-MACEDONIAN RELATIONS"  
 
For many years running, the development of Bulgarian-Macedonian relations 
was hampered by the effects of factors having both historical and political character. 
The inherited situation, of isolation, constant negative myth perpetuation and lack of 
contact between the two countries, turned out to be a serious obstacle to bilateral 
cooperation. For decades on end no practical framework was established for the 
development of bipartite relations between Bulgaria and Macedonia. For these 
reasons, the act of recognition of the Republic of Macedonia by Bulgaria at the 
beginning of the 90s proved not to be enough to overcome the obstacles preventing 
the development of bilateral relations. 
Along with those inherited obstacles from the past, a strong effect was felt in the 
period 1992-1998 from the unwillingness of the Macedonian authorities, dominated 
by the post-Yugoslavian political elite, to promote the development of bipartite 
relations. Furthermore, occasions which could hamper the development of such 
relations were constantly sought after.  
On the part of Bulgaria, significant mistakes were also made with regard to the 
formulation of its policy toward Macedonia. This was embodied in the first place in 
Bulgaria’s internal non-uniformity and conflicting character of its stand on the 
recognition of the Republic of Macedonia. Recognition of the Macedonian state was 
accompanied by the imposition of conditions of non-state-political character. The 
introduction of the language and nation issues into the discourse of bilateral relations 
was totally unnecessary and made dialogue considerably difficult. 
The formation in both Macedonia and Bulgaria of governments that are not 
bound by the previous stage of the relationship’s development led to new 
opportunities for the development of bipartite relations. The joint declaration signed 
by the prime ministers of both countries signed in February 1999 practically settled 
the deteriorated historical and political disputes that had hampered current 
development of the relations. The decision of Sofia and Skopje to sign treaties on the 
official languages fixed in the constitutions of the two countries enabled the speeding 
up of the development of economic, political and cultural relations between the two 
countries. No less important than the settlement of the so-called language problem 
was the mutual minority claim waiver. This declaration established the prerequisites 
for a qualitatively new stage in the development of economic, political and cultural 
cooperation between the two countries. 
The intention of the Bulgarian-Macedonian conference entitled “Prospects for 
the Development of Bulgarian-Macedonian Relations,” organized by the Institute for 
Regional and International Studies in cooperation with the Forum Centre for Strategic 
Studies, was to make use of this new dynamic of accelerating bilateral relations. The 
organizers were led by the conviction that the main purpose of the development of 
Bulgarian-Macedonian relations at present is to formulate and implement definite, 
pragmatic initiatives for cooperation in all fields of bilateral interest. The conference 
did not have the ambitious purpose of overcoming all inherited problems in relations 
between the two countries, but rather of bringing about the establishment of interest-
intersection fields, laying the foundations for positive dialogue and identifying 
effective mechanisms for the gradual solution of the problems. The conference was 
wholly focused on the settlement of practical problems in bilateral relations. 
The debate framework was outlined prior to the conference itself. It included 
the preconditions for the development of bilateral cooperation, as well as the fields in 
which that cooperation could be carried out. The main preconditions favoring the 
development of bilateral relations were indicated as follows:  
• The establishment of the independent Republic of Macedonia in 1992 as a 
sovereign act of self-determination of the people of Macedonia and the 
recognition of the Republic of Macedonia by Bulgaria, the first country to 
recognize the Republic of Macedonia among all other countries in the 
international community;  
• The development of democratic political processes both in Bulgaria and 
Macedonia, enabling the citizens of the two countries to, for the first time in 
decades, show their free will, and freely control their lives, identity and 
national development direction;  
• The orientation of both countries to the system of a free market economy, 
which requires the protection of individual freedom and enterprise and the 
elimination of all political, administrative and ideological barriers to the free 
exchange of people, goods and services between Bulgaria and Macedonia;  
• The explicit freely chosen aspiration of Bulgaria and Macedonia for European 
Union and NATO membership, which would turn the two countries into 
strategic partners in the fields of security, economic and social development, 
and civil and political cooperation in the protection and consolidation of the 
values of human rights, individual freedom and tolerant coexistence of peoples 
of different ethnic and religious identity;  
• The crisis process of the disintegration of former Yugoslavia, whose most 
severe stage – the Kosovo conflict – we are now going though, brought about 
a great number of long-term calamities. The isolation and embargo exercised a 
great depressing and corrupting influence on the economies of Bulgaria and 
Macedonia. The crisis drove hesitant foreign investors away from our 
countries and cut off our trade routes to Europe. As a result of the ethnic purge 
of Kosovo Albanians by the Milosevic regime, Macedonia was faced with the 
serious threat of economic collapse and social and political instability. At the 
same time the crisis offers Bulgaria and Macedonia new opportunities for 
development and cooperation. We are now in a process of dynamic, 
geostrategic regional change. For the first time in the modern history of 
Europe, the Balkans may have a chance to become an integral part of the “Old 
Continent.” In this way they will leave behind their geopolitical burden of 
being a “sanitary cordon” or a “powder keg” and develop their security 
systems on the basis of the contemporary European model of mutual 
commitment and balance, in which the security of one partner is a 
precondition for the security of all. In this new system there is no room for 
regional quasi-empires exercising dominance over their neighboring peoples. 
In this system there is no room for walls of barbed wire and artificially 
inspired hatred, such as the long-extant wall between Bulgaria and Macedonia. 
The fall of the Berlin Wall heralded the new unity of Europe. The fall of the 
wall between Bulgaria and Macedonia is the herald of the new unity in the 
Balkans. In this new unity all peoples should be equal participants;  
• Bulgaria and Macedonia are geographically located along international trade 
routes — including, for example, “the silk road” — which are under 
reconstruction, as well as the coming routes for the transportation of natural 
resources, the oil and gas of the Caspian Sea and Russia, to the West. This 
circumstance gives the two countries dynamic opportunities in building a 
modern infrastructure in the Southeastern European region;  
• We are closely related peoples, sharing the cultural heritage of common and 
sacred intellectual sources for the whole of Europe. The achievements of the 
brothers Saints Cyril and Methodius serve as irrevocable proof of Bulgaria and 
Macedonia belonging to the common history of Europe. It is in our own power 
alone to secure our place in the common future of Europe as well.  
The main fields of bilateral interest were systematized according to the 
following trends:  
• Cooperation in the expansion and activation of bilateral trade. Bulgaria and 
Macedonia have common trade interests regarding the reconstruction of trade 
routes in the region, reducing administrative and bureaucratic restrictions to 
crossing their borders, and simplifying and reducing customs tariffs. They also 
have common interests in providing non-visa or at least alleviated visa status 
for the business trips of citizens of their two countries in the Schengen zone. 
The trade restrictions resulting from the Kosovo conflict could be partially 
compensated by intensively establishing a common trade zone between the 
two countries and new types of structures of legislative and administrative 
conformity and integration of their trade policies;  
• Joint efforts for speeding the construction of the European transport corridor 
No. 8, completion of the railway line between the two countries and 
development of the highway network. Joint initiatives for approaching the 
potential investors in the transport infrastructure of the two countries: the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the U.S. Trade and 
Development Agency, the World Bank, private investment projects of the 
European Union and the United States. Coordinated efforts of the two 
countries for realization of the AMBO project, by means of intercession for 
the member-companies of the Caspian oil consortium, the U.S. federal 
authorities and EU institutions;  
• Cooperation in the partial compensation of economic damage resulting from 
the Kosovo crisis. Compensation of the Macedonian economy for the loss of 
partner-manufacturers and markets in Yugoslavia. Mutual investments and 
cooperative productions. Cooperation in the EU and NATO plans for post-war 
reconstruction of the region;  
• Development of common priorities for integration in EU structures. Both 
countries have a relatively long way to go toward full membership in the EU. 
Common selective strategic priorities for integration in the EU are necessary 
and important in the fields of infrastructure development, bringing the 
legislation of both countries closer to that in Europe, and formation of 
European structures and institutions for trade, economic, political and cultural 
cooperation;  
• Cooperation in the establishment of a common security system in the region. 
Coordinated strategies for NATO membership. Bilateral strategy on the 
problems of the so-called soft security issues; these are security problems of 
non-military character, and their importance has grown dramatically in the 
context of the Kosovo crisis and the post-crisis period. In this strategy it is 
necessary to include: joint efforts for control over the organized criminal 
economy, illegal traffic of arms, drugs and people across the borders; control 
over the ethnic instability factors and the factors causing intercommunity 
conflicts; and containing and controlling the waves of economic, political or 
ethnic instability generated by neighboring countries or regions;  
• Cooperation in the exchange of cultural values, educational and scientific 
programs, media products. The past administrative and legislative barriers 
restricting and hampering the free exchange of people, ideas and publications 
between the two countries should be eliminated. A considerable part of the 
misunderstanding in relations between the two countries is the result of 
propaganda schemes and disinformation mythology, inherited from the age of 
total isolation and institutional hostility. Truth can come only out of the liberty 
of ordinary people to communicate with each other and to choose between 
alternative information sources to form their own opinions and attitude toward 
the others. There should be cooperation between state institutions and civil and 
business circles of both countries toward the establishment of a system of 
exchange in the fields of science, culture and media. This system would not 
need special protection but would guarantee full value within the framework 
of principles, standards and institutions of free communication established in 
the democratic world. The rest depends on the initiative and interests of the 
citizens and intellectuals in both countries.  
In the text outlined above, the emphasis was on the necessity of giving priority 
to those pragmatic purposes in Bulgarian-Macedonian relations which directly 
determine the development of the two countries toward European integration, 
economic reconstruction and building up a security system and prosperity in the 
Balkan region. It was stressed that there will inevitably be unsolved problems in 
relations between Bulgaria and Macedonia, related to the past, history and its 
ambiguous interpretation. However, it is possible and necessary to place these 
problems at the far periphery of the dialogue between the two countries, so that they 
cannot hamper the development of cooperation in the spheres of practical common 
interest. Both countries and their politicians should refrain from official interpretation 
of the problems inherited from the past. The citizens and mostly the intellectuals of 
Bulgaria and Macedonia have to undertake a commitment to interpret those problems 
in the context of benevolent efforts to eliminate the negative remnants of the past in 
the name of a common future. 
The stand expressed above was used as a basis for discussion during the 
conference, whose purpose was the formulation of explicit suggestions for bilateral 
cooperation. The introductory lectures — those of Macedonian Foreign Affairs 
Minister Boris Traikovski and political scientist Ivan Krustev — elaborated on the 
situation, in which the two countries now are, and the problems and prospects for the 
development of Bulgarian-Macedonian cooperation in the future. 
In the course of the discussion, several suggestions regarding general bilateral 
cooperation were made:  
• Dynamic political cooperation and formulation of joint political attitudes of 
Bulgaria and Macedonia toward the main problems related to challenges in the 
region;  
• Joint planning of participation in international undertakings;  
• Working out of joint attitudes of the two countries toward participation with 
coordinated interests in the EU program for the reconstruction of the region in 
the post-crisis period;  
• Joint strategic planning in relation to the infrastructure initiatives in the 
Southeastern European region, Corridors No. 8 and No. 4 in particular;  
• Promoting public dialogue in both countries, with a view to the achievement 
of public consensus in favor of the consolidation and development of bipartite 
relations.  
Practical measures and initiatives for the development of bilateral cooperation 
in the fields of the economy, security, culture, science and media were discussed in 
both working groups. The discussion in the groups entitled “Economy and Security” 
and “Culture, Media and Public Opinion” was aimed at seeking specific 
organizational forms for the implementation of bilateral cooperation in those fields. A 
series of specific motions were adopted. They were meant for the governments, 
parliaments and other state institutions, media, economic organizations, business and 
civil associations of both countries. 
In the fields of the economy and security, the following motions were adopted:  
• Assimilation and harmonization of the legislation of both countries in these 
fields. This motion was put forward in terms of the existing difficulties in 
carrying out economic activity and investment due to a lack of effective 
legislation in both countries. In this sense, it was stressed that real cooperation 
could be achieved only after the establishment of an actually working legal 
framework for the security of economic activity. The harmonization of the 
legislation of both countries will contribute to the facilitation of economic 
exchange and mutual investment, as well as the promotion of effectiveness in 
the campaign against crime. This motion should be submitted to the 
legislation committees of the Parliaments of both countries.  
• Setting up a framework for the free transit of people, goods and services 
between the two countries;  
• Working out a program for the protection of bilateral relations and promotion 
of joint economic projects;  
• Formulating conceptions for the establishment of a Bulgarian-Macedonian 
investment bank;  
• Setting up a common mechanism and parallel administrative sections for risk 
analysis and estimation in the fields of economics, politics and security;  
• Working out a program for interaction between the Foreign Affairs and Justice 
ministries of Bulgaria and Macedonia on internal and regional security issues;  
• Setting up a permanent information system for the exchange of operative data 
on cross-border crime and organization of joint actions for the campaign 
against drug trafficking and organized crime.  
During the discussion in the “Culture, Media and Public Opinion” working 
group, the attention was focused on the necessity of joint projects under the situation 
of the new face of the region. Realizing that from now on the existing myths will 
again create barriers to bilateral relations, irrespective of the good intentions of 
governments, the discussion participants joined together in the opinion that 
exchanging the myths for the real is essential. They also realized the necessity of 
eliminating the remaining institutional barriers and allowing the exchange of cultural 
products between the two countries. It was pointed out that there should be specific 
initiatives from specific people and institutions in order to specify and optimize 
matters. 
The main motions framing the specific projects and initiatives for cooperation 
in the fields of culture, science and media, were the following:  
• To start exchanging significant literary pieces, which present and introduce 
Bulgaria and Macedonia in the modern culture. This motion was backed with 
the argument that the Great Wall, which was built up between the two peoples 
for decades, could be surmounted by the opportunity of penetrating beyond it, 
namely via awareness of the culture of the “other.”  
• Relevant to the subject was the idea of spreading Bulgarian and Macedonian 
literature in Macedonia and Bulgaria respectively, in the original languages of 
both countries. It was proposed that for poetry, in particular, that a bilingual 
model be applied, according to which the text is presented in both languages in 
parallel.  
• Related to this matter was the motion to organize circulation of newspapers 
and magazines on a principle of exchange. Another proposition concerned 
cooperation between Bulgarian and Macedonian newspapers and magazines 
covering similar subjects, including the publication of special editions devoted 
to the other country’s authors, poetry, publicity and so on.  
The participants in the Conference pointed out the necessity of eliminating 
administrative and institutional barriers to the free exchange of publications. On the 
part of Macedonia it was stressed that the registration regime for foreign (Including 
Bulgarian) publications at the Macedonian Foreign Affairs Ministry should be 
repealed. 
It was also emphasized that media could play an enormous role in eliminating 
the remnants standing in the way of true perception of “the other.” The electronic 
media were pointed out as the most powerful instrument for exercising influence on 
public opinion. A motion for signing an agreement between the Bulgarian and 
Macedonian national television stations was put forward. It envisages:  
• Television broadcasting on the principle of exchange without translation or 
censorship;  
• Exchange of television productions, devoted to Bulgaria and Macedonia 
respectively; making joint productions on common problems;  
• Making productions that present the points of view of both countries on 
controversial issues;  
• Television broadcasting of Bulgarian and Macedonian films in Macedonia and 
Bulgaria, respectively.  
This motion should be submitted to the management of the national and 
private television media of both countries. 
A motion for conducting a Bulgarian cinema week in Macedonia and a 
Macedonian cinema week in Bulgaria was also put forward. It should be submitted 
to the Ministries of Culture in Bulgaria and Macedonia and to the national 
cinema centers in both countries. 
In the field of theater, two specific motions were made:  
• Publication of an anthology of Bulgarian plays in the Macedonian language 
and one of Macedonian plays in the Bulgarian language;  
• Project for a joint theater production having a Bulgarian-Macedonian team and 
its performance in both countries.  
Macedonian participants made a motion in favor of publishing a Bulgarian-
Macedonian and Macedonian-Bulgarian dictionary, which according to them is 
necessary for more precise translations of poetry, essays, etc. 
Another motion concerned free academic exchange, which would include 
circulation of scientific literature, mutual visits of lecturers and students, and the 
organization of public lectures of notable public and political figures from Bulgaria 
and Macedonia. 
The motions for cooperation in the fields of common interest that were put 
forward during the conference could become a solid foundation for the work of state 
and private (civil) institutions on the development of bilateral relations. 
Within the next four to six months, a second Bulgarian-Macedonian 
conference will be held as a part of a project called “Cooperation Between Bulgarian 
and Macedonian Non-Governmental Organizations for Solving Problems in Bilateral 
Relations.” The main purpose of the project will be to evaluate the way in which the 
motions are put into action, as well as the factors in favor of or against the 
implementation of these motions. 
 
 
SECURITY AND RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE: 
A POLICY OUTLOOK FROM THE REGION 
 
STRATEGIES FOR DEMOCRATIZATION AND INSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT  
 
• Containment Of Ethnic Conflicts;  
• Effectiveness Of Public Administration And Public Control;  
• Civil Security And Civil Participation;  
 
The reconstruction of the Balkans after the Kosovo crisis cannot be accomplished 
merely by the “import” of modern institutional mechanisms. Despite numerous past 
examples of introducing similar up-to-date models that were effectively adapted to the 
local environment, the current rebuilding of the region should first call for an 
implementation of whole scale modernization, which, in particular cases, should aim 
at rebuilding communities. 
A clear cut modernization process requires on the one hand, maximal mobilization of 
the existing institutional resources of Balkan societies individually and in 
collaboration, and on the other hand effective mechanisms for adequate adaptation of 
the principles and institutions of a European-style democracy. 
 
The current assumption that introduced models of a pluralistic political system, free 
market economy and civic security really turn the countries of the region into full-
fledged democracies is rather formal and imprecise. The existence of these models is 
devoid of essence and meaning - they are often hollow shells and barren inside. 
 
The current assumption that introduced models of a pluralistic political system, free 
market economy and civic security really turn the countries of the region into full-
fledged democracies is rather formal and imprecise. The existence of these models is 
devoid of essence and meaning - they are often hollow shells and barren inside. 
The situation of complete institutional disintegration in some Balkan countries, the 
nominal existence or the quality of performance in other countries’ institutions 
necessitates clear definition of problems, common to the region and specific to the 
different states institutional problems in regard to the formulation of adequate and 
bringing to positive results initiatives for the Balkans. 
Levels of Institutional Development 
From the perspectives of the existing public and corporate institutional framework in 
the Balkan region of today we could distinguish among four basic levels of 
institutional development. 
The first level applies to countries and regions, which have almost no autonomous 
institutional capacity to assist reconstruction initiatives. The typical examples are the 
Kosovo region and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both areas are coming out of intensively 
destructive military operations, mass scale efforts of ethnic cleansing and other 
serious human rights abuses. The traditional political and administrative infrastructure 
of those territories has been disintegrated, the level of inter-communal communication 
and cooperation is extremely low, following years of systematic inter-ethnic clashes, 
and the institutions of communal life have been completely destroyed or suffer full 
inability to serve the communities in post-war conditions. At this level of institutional 
destruction and helplessness a full protectorate status, imposed militarily, politically 
and administratively is the only solution to create the necessary organizational 
background for a sensible peacekeeping, humanitarian and reconstruction and 
development program. The protectorate status may be complemented with a step by 
step development of autonomous democratic process of political representation at 
municipal and national level under international supervision. The process of 
democratic re-institutionalization in Bosnia after Dayton proved very slow and 
painful, especially at the level of interaction among the three entities -- Serb, Muslim 
and Croat. 
The second level of institutional development in the region refers basically to Albania 
and -- in some respects - to the Republic of Macedonia. Albania suffered a heavy 
crisis in its institutional development in 1997 and the Albanian state operates to a 
particular extent in selected regions of the country. The ability of the government and 
the public administrative system to enforce law and order and to exercise the basic 
functions of a state are seriously reduced in all basic fields of life. Albania, therefore, 
needs systemic external -- international efforts to re-structure its public institutional 
system and reproduce normal environment in the fields of security, law and order, 
welfare provision. This external effort will amount to a semi-protectorate status, in 
which an imported administrative system should co-exist with the existing domestic 
institutions of democratic representation of the Albanian citizens. 
Macedonia is a country, which has relatively high standard of public institutions 
performance compared to many other countries in the region. The point of 
vulnerability of Macedonia is specifically in the field of maintaining interethnic 
stability and in resisting the attempts of the present day Belgrade regime to de-
stabilize and control the country. For those reasons of security Macedonia will need 
mass scale international assistance in the field of security and national defense 
infrastructure. 
Third, Bulgaria, Romania and Macedonia (apart from its security dilemma) represent 
the highest level of institutional development. These countries have the autonomous 
ability to implement their political decision making in a public administrative process. 
Nonetheless, the efficiency level of their public administrative systems is remarkably 
low compared to the standards of the developed world. A system of direct assistance, 
and indirect stimuli should be developed to motivate these national governments to 
perform a large scale administrative reform, to reduce the skyrocketing levels of 
corruption, to promote a more effective system of public control over the executive 
and legal systems, to de-centralize the decision making process, and strengthen the 
municipal powers authority. Romania’s level of economic transformation is low and 
the country remains economically vulnerable. Bulgaria needs to improve its internal 
administrative conditions in order to attract private investment and register economic 
growth. 
The fourth level - Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) - represents an institutional 
dilemma. The country has a relatively well developed institutional system inherited 
from the former Yugoslav communist state. Following the recent military defeat, 
however, the growing political unrest will start Yugoslavia on its process of uneasy 
political transformation from authoritarian rule to democracy. This process is very 
likely to be accompanied by weakening of public institutions, disintegration of the 
system of law and order, and decline of the state's ability to serve the basic needs of 
the community. This case represents the most difficult scenario, and a minimum of 
political and institutional transformation should be carried out by Yugoslav citizens 
before the international community prove capable of providing help. 
Montenegro shows a better ability to adapt while a process of transforming its 
institutions than Serbia. However, this may accelerate the disintegration process of the 
Yugoslav federation. 
In Croatia, serious political change is expected to take place this year, which may lead 
to institutional change. By no means will it be even close to the dramatic institutional 
disintegration threatening Yugoslavia. 
 
Areas of Institutional Transformation 
Poor modernization of countries in the region and loss of early modern traditions in 
political democracy and private business, as well as the extreme crisis potential for 
ethnic conflict, underlay general institutional problems. Their concrete manifestation 
imposes a differentiated approach when elaborating concrete policies and initiatives in 
the followings areas:  
• containment of ethnic conflict;  
• effectiveness of public administration and public control;  
• civil security and civil participation.  
The above mentioned areas represent the main sources of institutional instability and 
weakness observed throughout the region with various intensity. Each attempt to 
provide general solutions must be based upon an understanding of the specific 
shortcomings in each area. 
 
Containment of Ethnic Conflicts 
The Balkans are an excellent example of a multiethnic environment. Every attempt - 
of the last 150 years and of the present - to create ethnically clean (and cleansed) 
nation states has had little to no chance of success. From this perspective, changing 
the national borders to improve a country's ethnic balance may have a short term 
effect, but will be dangerous in the long term. Major institutional change in the 
Balkans requires a new definition of the Balkan national community. The ethnic 
definition of the Balkan nations is the product of delayed national development of all 
its communities, resulting from disintegrating Ottoman and Habsburg empires. Thus, 
the new definition of nations should be based on civic solidarity and citizens' 
integration - irrespective of their ethnic group - into the common whole of a 
democratic and tolerant national community. Cooperation with other communities in 
the region in the framework of the European unity is the next step. Undoubtedly this 
process will be painful and sometimes - dramatic. Nonetheless, there is no alternative, 
because it is the only way to de-legitimize interethnic conflict as an instrument of 
defending national integrity and national sovereignty against “alien communities”. 
There has been a major miscalculation on the part of influential international 
institutions, human rights groups and local reformist movements that 
“multiculturalism”, defined as a system of institutionalizing collective political rights 
for diverse ethnic groups leads to inter-communal peace and understanding. The 
Balkans represent a predominantly paternalist type of communal culture, and the 
improvement of collective political rights has been directly stimulating a process of 
fragmentation and separatism. The absence of strong liberal-democratic institutions, 
capable of integrating citizens into national economic, civic and political life, and the 
presence of adverse corporate interethnic competition has made it possible for 
authoritarian ethnic-communal leaders and elites to enforce militant separatism as the 
only way of defending the ethnic or national interest. Bosnia Herzegovina and 
Kosovo are key examples of this point. 
It is essential to the ethnic peace and tolerance in the region to improve the 
institutional background and effective implementation of individual human rights and 
opportunities within a liberal-democratic system of citizens' equality and integration. 
The efforts of civic integration must be concentrated in the following areas of 
communal life:  
• Integration achieved by creating new economic opportunities and a cross-
communal market experience;  
• Integration achieved by a balanced system of equal participation in developing 
the educational system, access to the media, and freedom of cultural 
expression;  
• Integration achieved by developing cross-border cultural and economic 
regions, bringing together representatives from an ethnic community living in 
two or more neighboring countries;  
• Integration achieved by developing a culture of public tolerance, which makes 
discrimination unacceptable;  
• Integration achieved by improving the selective strategies of governments to 
assist underprivileged communities in the socioeconomic field;  
• The right of self-determination is not a right to secession: separatist 
movements should not be encouraged on either a regional or an international 
level;  
• The introduction of effective institutions to safe guard (and enforce) civil 
rights;  
• Inclusion of all citizens of a state in the political process on the basis of 
citizenship, given that all human and political rights on an individual basis are 
secured. The latter keeps to the principle of traditional liberal democracy for 
granting and respecting rights on an individual, not a collective basis, 
including the representatives of ethnic minorities. In the still parochial and 
kinship based societies of the Balkans, collective rights would further 
fragment the societies by encapsulating ethnic groups under the rule of 
authoritarian or patrimonial elites;  
 
Effectiveness of Public Administration and Public Control 
The effectiveness of public administration in the countries in South Eastern Europe 
raises the issue of establishing and consolidating political, economic and public 
institutions by means of rational structure and effective mechanisms for action as a 
clear-cut modernization process. The experience of these countries gained after the 
initiated transition from totalitarian rule to democracy shows that the administrative 
and technical introduction of institutions of modern liberal democracy is not enough 
to give meaning or content to the process of democratization. The ineffectiveness of 
public administration is a result of the following key assumptions of post-totalitarian 
societies:  
• lack of clear perception of public representation of interests;  
• weakly organized public control of public administration;  
• shortage of qualified people for political and corporate roles;  
A necessary requirement for the successful application of institutions of modern 
public administration is the stimulation of efficient pressure of legitimate organized 
group interests from society to the institutions of public administration. This means 
that public administration should become an intermediary by committing to:  
• strict implementation of norms and principles of modern public 
administration;  
• providing transparency and accountability (including access for regular 
citizens);  
• impartial attitude to enhance effectiveness and exclude corrupt practices;  
• objective and public mechanisms for recruiting executives at all levels;  
Potential results and expectations of the transformation of public administration in the 
region depend upon developing specific policies targeted at increasing its public 
accountability. One of the key issues in this field that needs to be addressed is the 
process of recruitment of candidates for public administrative positions. 
 
Civil Security and Civil Participation 
The weakness of public institutions poses serious challenges not only to the existing 
order but also to civic security in general. Organized crime, clan based illegal 
economy and traffic, large scale corruption and violation of citizens' rights is a direct 
consequence of both state institutions' inability to enforce law and order and of 
authoritarian attempts to compensate for institutional weakness with a greater (but not 
effective) government expansion towards society. A general improvement of the 
quality of civil life and guarantees of civic security should be based on the following 
priorities:  
• stimulation of effective civil equality and guarantees of equal opportunity for 
civil participation in public life;  
• independent and impartial legal system;  
• stimulation of the emergence of a corporate environment by increased foreign 
investment (predominantly private) in the region that would create a new 
social stratum of approximately 10-15% of the population, representing the 
most dynamic entrepreneurial and proactive citizens in society. In this way the 
criminal clan economy would be marginalized, and corporate group interests 
would be consolidated against further expansion of the state. Foreign 
investment must be encouraged by the international community, primarily by 
EU and US institutions;  
Developing Corporate Representation of Interests. It is impossible to directly 
implement the Western model of corporate competition of diverse organized 
(including ethnic) interests, exercising pressure on the state in their favor. The western 
corporate model has developed in the 20 century - after 200 years of successful 
liberal-democratic development. The stable western institutions of citizens' equality 
and democratic representation can easily host the new corporate structure of 
representation in all major Western societies. Countries in the Balkan region share a 
fragile institutional system of democracy, which is yet to be filled with real substance. 
This is why, initially the Balkans need selective strategies to support two types of 
corporate group representation, which stimulate the integrative process in society 
(business, NGOs, advocacy groups, etc.) and discourage the effects of corporate 
ethnic separatism, provided that all basic human rights of citizens and the 
communities are effectively guaranteed by the democratic institutions in the region. 
 
Expectations for the Region 
A collection of controversial historical, psychological, cultural and geopolitical 
factors has turned the Balkan region into one of the most amorphous places in Europe 
in terms of organized interests, potential for cooperative action, and ability to 
compromise and search for alternative options to promote one's national, communal 
or even personal interest. 
The mentality and culture of regional cooperation should be developed, even if the 
process takes decades. This makes it strategically more important to create and 
stimulate the development of an institutional system of regional cooperation in all 
major fields of the region's transformation - economy, security, conflict prevention, 
education and media, and civic cooperation. 
The Balkans have suffered a series of unsuccessful attempts of top-down regional 
integration: artificial federations, serving as a disguise for 'grand national' and quasi-
imperial projects. All efforts to bypass the real divisions by hiding them have failed. 
An adequate strategy for regional integration should be based on the real situation and 
should try to change it by developing alternative “bottom-up” grass roots models of 
cooperative activities. The basic purpose of such a strategy is to create and develop 
communities of people, sharing interest in growing cross-border cooperation in the 
fields of trade, education, culture, media, civic initiatives, technological and industrial 
development, and infrastructure development. Once developed, such communities 
would serve as powerful 'lobbyists' for the regional dimensions of political, economic 
and civic cooperation. 
 
THE PROCESS OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION AND 
DEVELOPMENT  
 
• Foreign Investment;  
• CEPS - European Integration and Development;  
• Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Infrastructure.  
 
Specifics of the Balkan Economic Environment 
The economic problems of the Balkans resemble a combination of negative 
tendencies, multiplying the region’s inability to autonomously cope with the priorities 
of its development and modernization. The region represents a reality of amorphous, 
isolated and poorly organized economic interests. This reality is a consequence of half 
a century communist rule and controversial economic strategies of post-communist 
transformation. The national wealth of the Balkan countries has been criminally 
redistributed. The accumulated economic assets have been disintegrated, and - to a 
great extent – practically lost. The huge de-capitalization process has been amplified 
by large scale emigration of educated and skilled representatives of the professional 
middle class, who have lost their jobs and their further chances in a collapsing 
economic environment. The ethnic conflicts and inter-communal wars in former 
Yugoslavia have dramatically reduced the relatively high performance of the former 
Yugoslav economy and living standards of the people. The international community’s 
embargo on Belgrade has greatly contributed to the isolation of the entire economic 
system of the region from the international markets and has additionally reduced the 
chances of the Balkans as an emerging market to attract investment and to intensify 
their participation in international commerce. The embargo had a powerful secondary 
effect on boosting the local mafia economics and supporting the corruption process 
among politicians and civil servants. The NATO campaign in Kosovo revived the 
effects of trade isolation, inaccessible infrastructure corridors and collapsing 
investment rating of the region. Last, but not least, the international financial crisis of 
1997-1998 has substantially hampered the Bulgarian and Romanian privatization 
process, previously boosted with the election of reformist governments in the both 
countries in 1996 and 1997. 
Goals, Strategic Objectives and Mechanisms for Economic Reconstruction of the 
Balkans after the Kosovo Crisis 
Goals and Strategic Objectives 
Development of viable market economy through:  
• stimulation of private business and local production;  
• intensive privatization in industry and banking;  
• development of active stock markets;  
• ensuring a favorable environment for foreign investment; and  
• reconstruction of infrastructure network as a basis for the economic resurgence 
of the region.  
The accomplishment of these goals will guarantee a lasting economic stabilization 
and development of the region and will contribute to meeting economic criteria for 
EU membership. 
Mechanisms of the International Organizations for Economic Reconstruction of 
the Region  
• Stimulation of foreign investment;  
• Establishment of special funds;  
• Financing infrastructure projects  
• Know how support in implementing economic reforms;  
 
Necessity of a Differentiated Approach 
The region’s aspirations to be integrated into European economic structures should be 
accompanied by the development of a differentiated approach when formulating the 
major issues of European intervention. Each country has a specific level of economic 
development. An important step to successful implementation of the reconstruction 
and development plan is to clearly define and distinguish the priorities of each of the 
Balkan countries:  
• The economic development of Bulgaria and Romania should be stimulated 
by: 
- large-scale private investment and special funds for crediting private 
businesses 
- projects for the development of an independent judicial system and effective 
administration 
- public and private investment in infrastructure reconstruction. The most 
important factor for the development of these countries is the existence of a 
stable environment for foreign investment and fast and effective reforms.  
• Albania and Macedonia are in need of institutional support and considerable 
financial assistance from international financial institutions. It is of special 
importance to Macedonia that public funds be established to balance budget 
expenditures on refugees. It is also important to incorporate private investment 
in order to stimulate stable economic processes. In Albania, economic 
reconstruction will be possible only on the condition that autonomous stable 
mechanisms of the public authority and administration be adequately 
developed.  
• The large-scale international financial support for Bosnia after the Dayton 
Accord proved to be an insufficient guarantee of economic reform and 
creation of an transparent functioning market economy. Urgent measures for 
integrating the economic activity of different communities should be 
undertaken in order to overcome the corruption and inefficiency of both the 
banking system and the bureaucratic apparatus. The international community 
should initiate programs for public institution building, guaranteeing real 
economic reform and efficient distribution of international financial aid.  
• It is of particular importance that Yugoslavia not only urgently applies for 
humanitarian assistance and avoids humanitarian disaster, but also undertakes 
initiatives for infrastructure reconstruction. Building-up the transport, 
telecommunications and energy infrastructure is of special importance for 
Yugoslavia’s economic development as well as for that of the region as a 
whole. The huge damages suffered by Serbia’s heavy and light industries, 
agriculture, and infrastructure as a result of the NATO campaign demand post-
war reconstruction of the region with considerable international financial 
support. The international involvement in Kosovo should focus on providing 
the basis for co-existence of diverse ethnic communities. It should also support 
the gradual rebuilding of the region’s infrastructure.  
 
Principle of Subsidiarity 
The assistance of the EU and the entire international community in the economic 
reconstruction and development of SEE should be based on the principle of 
subsidiarity. All measures of economic reconstruction and development have to be 
properly addressed at local and national level, or at the level of the entire region. This 
selective approach would guarantee:  
• the autonomous ability of local SME businesses and municipal initiatives to 
speed up economic reforms in their regions even if the national efforts are not 
effective enough;  
• flexible approaches which are needed in order to contain and resolve 
interethnic disputes and conflicts. They will be secured through local 
initiatives which would stimulate cross-communal markets and economic 
projects, involving different communities at local level within particular 
country or across national borders (bordering regions of two or more 
countries);  
• clear borders between the economic regulative policies of the national 
governments and the economic initiatives of citizens and regions;  
• effective policy decision making at national level, operating within a 
complexity of local, regional and international economic factors;  
• successful strategy of regional – Balkan – economic cooperation, capable of 
restricting and compensating for the “zero sum game” traditional approach of 
national governments to each others’ interests;  
• positive strategy of regional economic development, integrating diverse 
communities into an economic process of common benefit and common 
destiny.  
 
Regional Economic Cooperation as a Factor for Economic Reconstruction of the 
Region 
A Network of Regional Institutions 
The establishment of a system of specialized institutions and funds on a regional level 
is of special importance for the implementation of an overall regional economic 
strategy. These institutions and funds would support the development of potentially 
profitable sectors of the Balkan economies. It would be wrong to confine the efforts 
only to the establishment of a Reconstruction and Development Agency, whose basic 
activity would be focused on reconstructing the damaged Yugoslav infrastructure. 
The functioning of a well-developed network of regional institutions, which 
intensively supports the process of economic cooperation, is necessary for the 
implementation of real and effective regional economic integration. Cooperation 
among different types of institutions – international agencies for development of 
different economic sectors, funds for private business crediting in the region, branch 
industrial and trade associations, consulting agencies, strategic planning organizations 
– would be beneficial to regional integration. The functioning of a network of such 
institutions would provide formulation and consistent assertion of common regional 
economic interests. Such a network would stimulate the dissemination of regional 
models of economic development, which would clarify the Balkan economic 
environment’s specific needs and peculiarities. 
In this case it would be appropriate to use the experience accumulated by some 
countries in the region (i.e. Bulgaria and Romania) in adapting European economic 
development models in conditions of poor modernization and economic 
backwardness. 
These countries would contribute significantly to the voicing and implementation of 
common regional interests. Bulgaria would help in the restriction of criminality, 
establishment of democratic and market economy institutions, and in the integration 
of ethnic communities. 
The Bosnia Experience 
Coordination of the efforts of all donors. The efficient coordination of the efforts of 
all donors is a significant element of the reconstruction and development strategies for 
Southeastern Europe. The negative experience from Bosnia and Herzegovina reveals 
two shortcomings of reconstruction programs:  
1. insufficient coordination of donors, which resulted in duplication of their 
efforts in place of creating diverse funds  
2. “pouring out” of huge investment solely into infrastructure, which does not 
produce a direct positive economic result.  
Regional Cooperation in Coordinating International Initiatives and Programs. 
There is a definite necessity for initiating a regional development system. It would be 
strongly supported by which would coordinate initiatives and programs. International 
financial institutions would provide the necessary credits, whereas private businesses 
would find viable investment opportunities. It would be appropriate to consign a 
certain quota of the offers for reconstruction of post-war Yugoslavia to support the 
fragile positions of private business in the Balkans. In this regard, there is a potential 
for cooperation among companies from the region, as well as between Western and 
local companies as subcontractors or material suppliers. 
Inclusion of Yugoslavia in the Process of Economic Reconstruction of the Region 
In the process of reconstruction of Southeastern Europe, the countries in the region 
should not become “hostages” of the isolationist stand of Yugoslavia. Any delay in 
the reconstruction of the region because of the Milosevic’s regime would have a fatal 
impact on the economies of the Balkan countries. An overall process of economic 
reconstruction and development of the region cannot be accomplished without the 
participation of Yugoslavia. This country has a key geographical location within the 
infrastructure network in the region and for the regional cooperation development. 
Infrastructure Development 
The further construction and connection of a united regional network of the existing 
transport, energy and telecommunications infrastructure is a necessary basis for the 
economic reconstruction and development of the Balkan countries. Annex 1 to the 
Declaration of the “Europe South-East” forum on the Stability Pact (Ljubljana, 18-20 
July 1999) defines the basic principles of infrastructure development of Southeastern 
Europe as follows:  
• Developing complementary (and not alternative) national infrastructure 
strategies of the SEE countries as part of an integrated infrastructure for the 
region;  
• Implementing the principle of alternative transport opportunities for each one 
of the SEE countries in its routes to Central and Western Europe;  
• Balanced development of the South-North and East-West axes of the SEE 
transportation system;  
• Diversification of energy resources supplies to the SEE countries (oil and gas);  
• Priority linkage of the SEE countries’ electricity system to the European 
electricity network (UCPTE);  
• De-monopolization and competitive development of the SEE countries’ 
telecommunications systems;  
• Development of a flexible system of project investment into the SEE 
infrastructure involving EU public funds, private investment, concession 
options, BOT or BOO methods.  
Transport Network 
Implementation of transport projects demands considerable funds, which could be 
paid back over a long period of time. In this case, different models could be 
introduced using joint financing combining sources from European funds, European 
financial institutions, and state budgets of SEE countries. The most attractive 
transport projects could draw the attention of private investors. 
The following projects are of urgent necessity:  
• Constructing two new bridges over the Danube: one between Vidin-Kalafat 
(Bulgaria-Romania) as part of Corridor # 4 (Dresden-Prague-Vienna-Arad 
(Bucharest-Constanta) - Sofia - Thessalonica; and the second one between 
Becket-Oriahovo, or Rastu-Lom or Turnu Magurele-Svistov (Romania-
Bulgaria);  
• Constructing 56 km of railroad between the Macedonian town of Kumanovo 
and the Bulgarian border (Corridor #8 - also known as “East-West” through 
Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania) as part of Macedonia’s access to Corridor # 
4. This would connect Macedonia to Central and Western Europe and give it 
access to the Black Sea ports.  
• Reconstruction of the main Kosovo highways connecting Mitrovica-Pristina-
Skopje; Pristina-Nis; Mitrovica-Podgorica; Pristina-Prizren-Durres;  
• Reconstruction of the Yugoslav bridges over the Danube and the destroyed 
sectors of Corridor #10 (the so-called Trans-European Motorway) in FR 
Yugoslavia.  
Energy 
In the area of energy, necessary funds can be provided more easily. The transportation 
of energy resources between countries and regions is a profitable activity. A Western 
private model of financing by Western private investors can be applied here. The most 
important regional projects are: projects for transporting oil and gas from Russia and 
the Caspian region, for reconstruction and construction of linkages between the 
countries of Southeastern Europe for transmitting electrical energy, and for 
construction and reconstruction of electric power-stations. 
Telecommunications 
In the area of telecommunications the most effective formula for financing would also 
be by attracting private capital. Along with further construction of major international 
telecommunications projects, the reconstruction of the telecommunication structure in 
Yugoslavia is gaining momentum. 
The CEPS Process - European Integration and Economic Development 
The CEPS process is the first clear example of an EU strategic plan to assist the 
economic development of the Balkan region and to strengthen the opportunities to 
further accession of the SEE countries to the European Union. The CEPC proposals 
for a regional customs union, Euroization of the financial systems of the Balkan 
countries and lifting of the EU tariffs for SEE industrial goods represent a coherent 
initial basis for the Stability Pact economic activities. The proposed economic 
assistance of 5 billion Euros per year could substantially contribute to the economic 
recovery and infrastructure development in the region. The involvement of the policy 
studies’ institutions from the SEE countries into the CEPS process and the support to 
the process from major Western donor institutions represents an extremely positive 
experience of cooperation between the EU and the international institutions and the 
independent policy communities in SEE. 
There are some substantive issues of national interest, which must be addressed by the 
EU and the countries in the region in the CEPS plan context:  
• Does the repudiation of these sovereign rights and mechanisms of independent 
economic policy provide Balkan countries with an opportunity for 
representation in the EU institutions, making decisions for their development?  
• To what extent is the discrepancy between the processes of economic and 
political integration to EU admissible?  
• What is the risk of economic integration when EU requirements have not been 
fulfilled?  
• Why is the zero-tariff regime for agricultural goods completely disbalanced in 
favor of the EU and at the expense of the SEE countries. This issue is 
particularly acute provided the restricted opportunities of the SEE industrial 
goods to compete at the EU market;  
 
A NEW SECURITY SYSTEM FOR THE BALKANS: POLITICAL-
MILITARY DIMENSIONS  
 
• The  Balkans In NATO's New Strategy;  
• Building a Security System In The Region;  
• Political-Military Cooperation In The Region.  
 
The Kosovo crisis and its aftermath have brought about significant changes to the 
security environment in the Balkans. As a result of the crisis many latent tendencies 
and long existing issues that prevent achieving peace and stability in the region came 
to the surface and call for the development of a new security system. The process of 
defining a new security system for the Balkans is subject to several internal and 
external factors. 
Institutional Development and Security Issues of the Region 
Following the developments of the past decade, Balkan countries formed five groups 
of states in accordance to the level of state institutional development and relationship 
to NATO: 
Turkey and Greece. Both countries are members of the Alliance. They have 
sustainable institutional infrastructures and their influence on the security 
environment in the region is significant. 
Bulgaria and Romania. Bulgaria and Romania are among the most well-identified 
candidates for NATO membership. Their institutional infrastructure fails to reach the 
level of the first group, but it is in much better shape that the rest of the countries. 
Macedonia and Albania. Both countries desire NATO membership but are currently 
subject to intensive assistance on behalf of the Alliance in order to guarantee the 
minimal basis of their security requirements. NATO’s role is critical in both 
countries: Macedonia does not have the resources to meet internal or external threats 
to its national security, and Albania needs to build its institutional infrastructure and 
consolidate its state power. Macedonia and Albania are under the protection of the 
international community more than any other state in the region. 
Kosovo. Kosovo’s territory has been divided into five sectors which are under the 
authority of NATO member states and Russia. The protectorate seems to be the 
temporary solution to the issue of the province’s future. By implementing different 
forms of coexistence and cooperation between hostile ethnic groups, the international 
community is testing the ground in order to decide Kosovo’s future status -- in or out 
of Yugoslavia. 
NATO and the Balkans after the Kosovo Crisis 
The outcome of the crisis was said to have a major impact on NATO’s reputation. 
Since the period of the Cold War the Alliance has been searching for a new identity 
by adapting to the changing geopolitical situation. NATO’s intention of transforming 
itself from an alliance for collective security into an international security system was 
successfully tested in Kosovo. Meeting the challenge of the Kosovo was of critical 
importance to the Alliance, whose 50th anniversary was during the crisis. 
The Kosovo crisis tested not only the countries in the region aspiring to NATO 
membership -- their readiness to support the policies and military operations of the 
Alliance, but also the support of certain member countries. NATO’s involvement in 
the Balkans may be determined by the fact that after the accession of Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the Alliance, NATO’s borders are much closer 
to the region and any instability could easily spread into the Euro-Atlantic area. 
All of this will undoubtedly influence the degree of NATO activity in the post-crisis 
management and reconstruction of the region. NATO’s commitment to the future 
development and reconstruction of the Balkans could be an efficient tool to prevent 
present and future conflict in the region along with its potential to damage European 
stability as a whole. 
 
Building a Security System in the Region 
Regional Security Factors 
External 
The Role Of The US. During the Kosovo crisis the US demonstrated its potential to 
set policy and influence the course of events in the region in its favor. US diplomacy 
once again proved to be the main generator of initiatives in the military-political field, 
putting the US in a position of determining and steering cooperative security among 
Balkan states. For that same reason the United States has the ability to stimulate 
military-political initiatives in the region. US strategic interest in developing such 
initiatives comes from the need to build a strategic sphere of security and stability 
around the eastern flank of NATO which may tap into a potential spread of external 
instability in the Euro-Atlantic area. 
The Role Of Russia. As a result of the Kosovo conflict NATO’s relations with Russia 
became quite tense. The bombing of Serbia lead Russia to freeze all cooperative 
activities with the Alliance. This development in NATO-Russian relations determined 
the ‘negative’ behavior of Bulgaria and Romania in regard to Russia. 
After the Kosovo crisis Russia, which had been Serbia’s traditional supporter, 
denounced the concept of the allied command in Kosovo and requested its own sector. 
By taking such a position Russia once again confirmed its strategic interests in the 
Balkans and posed the question of how much potential it has for retaining its sphere 
of influence. 
Undoubtedly Russia will be one of the main factors in the post crisis situation in the 
Balkans. It will be up to the diplomatic efforts of the countries in the region to have 
the role of Russia contribute to their peace and security rather than be an obstacle to 
the European integration of the region. 
The European Defense Identity. The Kosovo crisis also acted as a catalyst for the 
European allies to reexamine and redefine their own identity in terms of security and 
defense issues. The US statement that Europe should undertake the reconstruction of 
the region because Washington contributed two thirds of the military operation in 
Kosovo has put the European allies in a new position. Building the institutional 
infrastructure and administration of the conflict area gives the European allies a 
unique opportunity to be a major factor of influence. This, combined with the 
recognition of the right to autonomous action on behalf of the EU in solving issues 
which are now a direct security concern to the Alliance as a whole, will make Europe 
a guarantor of the stability in the region. 
The Role of OSCE. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe as a 
pan European organization has the potential to contribute to the peaceful 
reconstruction of the region. However, it is still not clear, in terms of responsibilities 
and commitments, what OSCE’s role and participation in the development and 
reconstruction of the Balkans will be. 
Internal 
The KLA. The current structure and policies of the Kosovo Liberation Army are a 
serious challenge to peace and security in the region. In reality the KLA is a military 
political organization which has the potential of maintaining ethnic conflicts, and for 
that reason it is a threat to the development of civil society and the peaceful 
reconstruction of the region. 
In this regard the disintegration of the KLA and establishment of civil political parties 
in the province should be one of the first steps in the reconstruction of the region. 
Regional Relations. The regional relations between Balkan states in the context of the 
Kosovo crisis are an important factor for security throughout the region. Mutual 
efforts in this respect have resulted in a series of successful initiatives, one of them 
being the South Eastern European Defense Ministerial. 
 
Principles of Building a Security System in South Eastern Europe 
NATO and the Framework of International Relations in the Region 
The requirements for obtaining NATO membership set the framework of international 
relations in the region to a great extent. Among the basic criteria are: keeping good 
relations with neighbor countries, deterring the use of force, reforming the armed 
forces, and building operative compatibility. This said, military political cooperation 
of the Balkan countries will play a crucial role in fulfilling the requirements and 
expediting their integration into NATO. In the past few years the countries in the 
region have been attempting to strengthen their bilateral and multilateral relations in 
order to adopt an integrated approach to regional security. 
 
Regional Application of the Subsidiarity Principle 
The international community’s efforts to sustain peace and security in the region 
should concentrate more on the specific application of the subsidiary principle, i.e., all 
local security issues should be solved at every possible level. The countries which 
have the resources and are able to face their own security challenges should act by 
themselves, without the direct involvement of NATO or the EU. The involvement of 
the international community in solving security problems and establishing a security 
agenda of the region should take place only in countries which are not able to provide 
their own security. 
In Kosovo, the international community is involved in guaranteeing the security and 
existence of almost every single individual. In other countries like Bulgaria, despite 
the irregularities of domestic life, security of the individual and maintaining of public 
order are within the authority of the sovereign state power. In Macedonia, the 
involvement of the international community in security affairs is greater, but should 
not enlarge its scope to soft security issues, which the Macedonian government is 
capable to meet effectively. 
The level of development of the institutional infrastructure of each country in the 
region determines the level of involvement of the international community in 
domestic affairs. Hence, it is important for the peace and security in the region that 
countries like Albania and Macedonia receive significant institutional support from 
NATO and the EU while the other group of countries - Bulgaria and Romania - 
should be given a clearer time estimate of eventual NATO membership. 
 
Reform of the Armed Forces  
The reform of the armed forces, especially in Romania and Bulgaria, is important to 
the future of the new strategic environment of the region. The reform in both 
countries is focused on downsizing the total standing and enhancing the defense 
capability of the armed forces. 
 
Transformation from Consumption to Generation of Security 
The national security doctrines of some of the countries in the region introduce the 
idea of transforming the countries from consumers of security into generators of 
security. The main prerequisites for achieving this goal are active foreign policy and 
building good relations with neighboring countries. The need of such policy arises 
from the conclusion that the successful integration of the countries in EU and NATO 
depends on the development of the peace process in South Eastern Europe; military 
conflicts and regional instability being mere obstacles. Generating security also means 
that the countries in the Balkans will no longer be able to keep formal neutrality or 
adopt a passive position in regard to solving regional problems. 
 
Regional - National Security 
Almost all countries in the Balkans are starting to realize that regional security is the 
major guarantee for the national security of each individual state. This understanding 
stimulates mutual initiatives for increasing trust, participation and commitment to 
solving problems of common concern. Political elites in different Balkan countries see 
this to be an opportunity for preserving peace and stability in their own countries. 
 
Military-Strategic Environment and Cooperation in the Region 
The military-strategic environment of the region consists of local conflicts and crises, 
disintegration of political establishments, serious migration and refugee flow, arms 
trafficking, and degradation of the environment. Facing these challenges is possible 
only through regional cooperation in the common security area. 
 
New National Defense Concepts 
Many countries in the region are in a process of building new concepts of national 
defense. All military doctrines state as one of their major goals of the armed forces the 
creation of “a favorable environment for national security”. In other words, each 
country’s reform of its armed forces is a major factor for integration into NATO and 
the EU. 
 
Regional Activity and NATO  
A recent tendency of regional activities in Balkan countries is to initiate new and 
different forms of mutual cooperation and cooperation with NATO. Some of these 
include active participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, providing 
logistic support to NATO and the continuing commitment to Partnership for Peace. 
 
Collectivism and Individuality as Integration Principles 
The countries from the region looking towards NATO membership must combine 
both principles. On one hand, they should act together in order to attract the interest of 
the Allies and better their chances for obtaining membership in NATO. On the other 
hand, each country is interested in building its own identity as an applicant for NATO 
membership. The Membership Action Plan adopted at the Washington Summit 
stipulates that each country should develop an individual plan for achieving 
membership but at the same time each applicant country should remain committed to 
mutual initiatives like Partnership for Peace. 
 
Regional Military-Political Relations and Cooperation 
The South Eastern European Defense Ministerial 
One of the most explicit forms of multilateral cooperation has been the meeting of the 
ministers and deputy ministers of defense of the countries in South Eastern Europe 
(SEDM). At SEDM decision makers from the region lay the groundwork for real-time 
policy making. 
The main accomplishments of SEDM are: involving Macedonia, announcing mutual 
interests in harmonizing national military policies, having the US commit to the future 
of the forum, inviting Slovenia as an observer, and bringing together NATO member 
countries and applicants. 
SEDM failed to incorporate Russia and Yugoslavia, which is considered to be a major 
obstacle for the future of this form of multilateral cooperation in South eastern 
Europe. 
Multinational Peace Force in SEE (MPFSEE) 
MPFSEE has introduced a new form of regional cooperation by establishing a 
common military force for protecting security interests of countries in the region. All 
countries are equal and voluntary participants in MPFSEE. The Force has brought 
about a new approach to security in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond - providing 
regional sources of security is an important step in the concept of security. 
MPFSEE is to be used in operations led by NATO or WEU in the region or elsewhere 
in EuropeThe success of this initiative will reduce outside intervention for preserving 
regional peace and stability and transform Balkan countries from objects into subjects 
of their own security. 
MPFSEE is one of the first attempts to apply NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force 
concept. 
 
Southeastern Europe Construction Brigade (SEECONBRIG) 
The idea for establishing the Southeastern Europe Construction Brigade was adopted 
at the second South Eastern European Deputy Defense Ministerial in 1999. The 
purpose of SEECONBRIG is to support the postwar reconstruction and development 
of the region. 
 
Expectations for Security System for SEE 
After the culmination of the Kosovo crisis and the international intervention for 
preserving peace and stability in South Eastern Europe, the international community 
as well as the countries from the region will have to consider new concepts and 
strategies for building a new military strategic environment in the region. This 
requires a relatively new approach for finding an effective security system. 
The main principles of the organization of such a system, already mentioned, are 
based on enhancing regional military cooperation by developing bilateral and 
multilateral relations; supporting the transformation of countries in the region from 
consumers of security to generators of security by developing appropriate military and 
institutional resources for facing military and non-military threats to national and 
regional security. 
The new military strategic environment in SEE requires a redefinition and specific 
application of existing security concepts:  
• collective security, enforced by NATO member countries, is not a reliable 
option for the countries in the region, which should first develop their own 
security resources;  
• regional security is seen by local governments as a factor of major importance 
to national security. At the same time regional security in SEE was recognized 
by NATO as one of the most important external factors for the security in the 
Euro-Atlantic area;  
• the concept of cooperative security projected by NATO comes as a result of 
enhancing regional security by turning it into a strategic framework of 
economic, political and defense cooperation. National security objectives can 
be directed towards shared goals of maintaining stability and security in the 
common area. Countries can develop mutual protection against external 
threats while supporting stability and development in the common area.  
The effectiveness of the new security system for SEE will be based on several pillars:  
• further development of military-political cooperation, establishing a network 
of crisis management and conflict prevention mechanisms and institutions;  
• coordination and exchange of information on defense plans and field military 
activities between the countries from the region;  
• development of mutual training of military personnel and officer exchange 
programs and enhancement of bilateral and multilateral military initiatives.  
The successful development of military-political relations between SEE states 
towards initiating a common security system is also subject to the perceptions and 
readiness of officers and troops from different countries to work in cooperation with 
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I. The Kosovo crisis – problems of legitimacy. 
The crisis in Kosovo opened the door to a completely new type of 
international involvement and management of local inter-communal clashes. It’s 
already been more than 120 years since the international community (in the format of 
the “European Concert of Powers”) has intervened for the first time into a local crisis, 
using the arguments of humanity and human rights defense. This happened in 1876 
when the Ottoman Empire defeated a rebellion of the Bulgarian population, claiming 
independence from the Porte. The huge atrocities of the Ottoman troops against the 
civilian population have actually lead to mass scale public opinion condemnation in 
Europe and in the US and brought the ‘Great Powers’ on the conference table in 
Constantinople in resolving the ‘Eastern Question’. 
Mass-scale violations of human rights have been in the focus of the 
international public opinion and the community of democratic states throughout the 
20C. That stimulated the sophistication of international law in many aspects – limiting 
the means of legitimate warfare, establishing clear status for refugees, military 
prisoners of war, civilians in war stricken regions, etc. The League of Nations, 
established in 1919 as an instrument to preserve the new status quo in post war 
Europe and to contain revisionist attempts on behalf of the defeated nations, has been 
the first precedent of an international organization (even if very fragile and ineffective 
one), aimed at mediating among the nations’ interests from the position of defined 
principles, including the principles of human rights observation. 
The Holocaust and other immense atrocities of the Nazi machine throughout 
World War II brought to the international scene the UNO as the first precedent of an 
international institution, capable of enforcing decisions made. At the same time it was 
effectively restricted in its instruments to do that in most of the individual cases when 
the UNO has opposed inhumane practices around the world. The logic of the Cold 
War has substantively reduced the ability of the UNO to prosecute major cases of 
human rights violations, even if those cases have been treated by the Assembly 
resolutions or even by the Security Council decisions. 
In all cases of international treatment of human rights’ abuse throughout th 20 
century one basic principle of the international system has dominated both the logic of 
international decision making and the practical interventions into conflict stricken 
areas. This is the principle of national sovereignty and the legitimacy of the sovereign 
national decision making over the particular process – subject of international 
concern. If we, for example, take a look at the so called ‘third basket’ of the Helsinki 
Act of 1975, what we’ll see formulated is the principle right to monitor human rights 
status in a nation state. The latter, though, goes together with the obligation of the 
state not to impede, but to support such an independent monitoring. 
The crises of disintegrating Yugoslavia – among other comparable events in 
the post Cold War world - have caused gradually developing precedents both of 
undermining the sovereignty of decision making at nation state level (through 
relativating the very concept of state sovereignty), and of international interference 
with strong obligatory enforcement. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the nation 
state as a sole legitimate agent in the international relations has been to a large extent 
replaced by the autonomous participation in the international crisis management of 
the conflicting parties’ leaders – the Muslim Boshniaks, the Serbs and the Herzeg 
Bosnia Croats. The internationally recognized sovereign – the state of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina – had no practical legitimacy to play a role, larger than the Muslim party 
representation. The confusion of this semi-legitimate international status of the three 
conflicting communities has become explicitly obvious at Dayton, where the 
legitimacy problems have been resolved through involving the presidents of two 
neighboring states – Serbia and Croatia as parties to the agreement for peace in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The Bosnian crisis has shown the largest ever involvement of international 
organizations into a conflict management process. The EU, the OSCE, the UNO, 
NATO – to enlist only the major ones – have been direct participants in managing the 
conflict, even if their efforts have been ineffective for years. Only the combination of 
UNO Security Council resolutions and the willingness of NATO to execute them have 
finally produced the fragile resolution of the crisis at Dayton. The UNO – NATO 
partnership combined the legitimacy of the international organization with the 
executive ability of the military-political union, for the first time acting out of the 
zone of its principle responsibilities. 
The Kosovo crisis represented a difficult case of legitimizing an international 
involvement from its very beginning. First, the crisis took place in the undisputed 
sovereign territory of the FR Yugoslavia. Unlike Bosnia, where the majority of the 
population (Serbs and Croats) has disputed the very statehood, Kosovo represents 
integrative territory of the Republic of Serbia – the bigger partner in the rump-
Yugoslav federation. The Albanians – whose position within the territory and the state 
constitution has been the focus of dispute – represented a significant minority within 
the state of Serbia. Changing, or improving their status could be a result of sovereign 
Serb – Yugoslav decision making process. The legitimate body of international 
intervention – the UNO – could act as a strong mediator, enforcing international 
peace-keeping mission in the disputed region, but the UNO could have no authority 
either to control larger territory of the FRY, or to change the status of Kosovo itself. 
This is the framework, in which all international actors, mediating in the crisis 
operated until the end of 1998. The first significant point of departure has been 
Rambouillet. 
The draft agreement, proposed to the Serb delegation at Rambouillet contained 
many unacceptable elements for the Milosevic regime in Belgrade. Giving up controls 
over the disputed Kosovo region under a peaceful agreement would present Milosevic 
as a traitor in the eyes of the nationalist Serb public opinion. The strong man in 
Belgrade had already once felt the strength of his angry fellow compatriots after 
having signed the Dayton agreement against the will of the Bosnian Serbs. This time 
the reaction could be even stronger. That was enough argument to refuse signature at 
Rambouillet. But the draft agreement, prepared by the leaders of the West for 
Rambouillet contained one more significant obstacle to an easy surrender on behalf of 
Belgrade. According to the draft clauses and amendments, the peace keeping units of 
the NATO (not of the UN) in Kosovo would have free access to the entire territory of 
the FRY without being subject to the internal Yugoslav law. Obeying to such a clause 
would mean principle surrender of the FRY sovereignty on behalf of Milosevic 
regime. Such a precondition appears for the first time in an international effort to 
monitor and mediate in a crisis region in order to serve the observation of human 
rights there. 
The propagandist legitimization of the NATO campaign against official 
Belgrade was built around the global character of the human rights principles and the 
responsibilities of the ‘international community’ to defend those rights in a global 
world. The growing integrity of uniting Europe was used as a powerful additional 
argument. But the split between the positions of the major Western leaders, united 
around the NATO, and the UNO, where Russia and China hold veto powers at the 
Security Council, has reduced the legitimacy of the ‘international community’ further 
action to the arguments of the major Western powers. The military campaign against 
Belgrade was carried out as a result of the united will of those Western powers. Only 
after Milosevic gave up to the military pressure and opened the door to the 
international peace keepers of KFOR, agreement involving the UNO as a formal 
agency of control over the international force had been made possible. These 
developments have outlined a new framework of international action legitimization in 
the field of conflict management. 
First, the national sovereignty is no longer an obstacle to international action, 
when major violations of human rights are considered to have occurred. That will 
have major implications upon the entire international system. Viewing international 
relations in substance, smaller countries in numerous regions of the world have often 
been considered sovereign only de jure. Poverty and economic crises, strong 
neighbors and traditional imperial masters have often reduced national sovereignty to 
a nominal existence. The entire Soviet block throughout the Cold War has been 
constituted of sovereign on paper satellites. Kosovo, though, represents a precedent in 
which human rights concerns have been considered as a senior and more valuable 
principle of the international system, than the principle of sovereignty. This has 
immediately raised the question about the legitimate authority, capable to judge where 
is the point, in which sovereignty gives up its primacy to the human rights concerns. 
If sovereignty becomes relative, what will be the institutional basis of the 
international system from now on? 
Second, there is no valid international authority to make decisions and act on 
behalf of the community of nations in cases of violent crises or major conflicts. The 
UNO and its Security Council do not, obviously, reflect the new power structures of 
the post Cold War world. In the case of Kosovo, the leaders of the West decided to 
bypass the UNO and act against Belgrade, legitimizing NATO as the new instrument 
of executing the decisions of the ‘international community’, thus de-legitimizing the 
‘great power’ status of Russia and China. The NATO summit in Washington D.C., 
celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Alliance, adopted in effect a new framework of 
the NATO strategy and territorial range of operation, involving Central and Eastern 
Europe as parts of the Alliance’s legitimate territory of action. Of course, this new 
strategic framework has been based on the evident will of most Central and Eastern 
European countries to join NATO and to be part of the Euro Atlantic security system. 
NATO’s obligation to act in favor of human rights defense has additionally been 
legitimized by the fact that only nations with democratic political systems may 
constitute the Alliance’s membership. But this set of arguments does not resolve the 
major issue, stemming from the substitution of the UNO – the world international 
organization – with a military-political alliance with regional scope of its mission. In 
the case of NATO Kosovo action democratic nations defend a minority, subjected to 
violent atrocities by an authoritarian regime. What if a regional organization, 
defending religious or cultural identity with fundamentalist principles interferes into a 
sovereign nation from the same region, legitimizing its action with the argument that 
this non-compliant nation does not observe ‘the values and the principles of …’ 
Europe and the Western world could not successfully defend the precedent of a 
regional scope organization’s military action against a sovereign country with the 
argument that ‘our values are humane, and more than that – universal’. In a culturally 
diverse world international law will be less capable than ever to tell the difference 
between Western laic values, Christian values, or Islamic and Hindu values, 
concerning human rights or any other field of value systems definition. 
Third, loosing the authority of the single international organization, which 
builds up a process of consensus on international conflict management action, and 
reducing the status of national state sovereignty in the international system impairs the 
legal definitions of the necessary threshold to international intervention. The world 
becomes much more relative in terms of responsibilities and rights. We live in a 
multicultural world. We have always lived in a multicultural world. What makes the 
difference today is that we assess positively the fact of multicultural living. This 
positive assessment, though, does not make it easier to define the rules of 
multicultural living. The nation state sovereignty has always been based on the 
principle of self-determination. A community becomes a sovereign only after proving 
it is a nation. (Long term struggles and dear victims usually pave the road to national 
emancipation in an entire epoch of human history – the epoch of the modern world.) 
A democratic nation has the obligation to observe the rights of all its citizens, 
including those belonging to minority communities, without being obliged to 
recognize those minorities’ right to self-determination. Turning this principle into a 
relative one, opens the door to an endless process of communal claims for self-
determination, with no possible end up. The endless self-determination process 
promises an endless chain of inter-communal conflicts and endless interventions of 
the ‘international communities’, aimed at human rights defense and at restoring 
peaceful coexistence. An endless chain of international protectorates, devouring 
humanitarian aid and preventing hostile clans to sit at each other’s throats may well 
replace the imperfect, but stable world of sovereign states. 
Let’s take a look at Bosnia and Kosovo. Enormous amounts of international 
funds maintain weak protectorate administrations, presiding upon intense corruption 
and organized crime, tense inter-communal relations and continuous efforts to ethnic 
cleansing, performed by the currently stronger communities. The structural weakness 
of the ‘international community’ to deal with escalating communal claims has been 
perfectly well demonstrated in the process of ex-Yugoslavia’s disintegration. The first 
step has been to recognize the constituent republics. The next challenge immediately 
followed – Bosnia, an entity, which had no autonomous chance to survive the internal 
clash. A second step – semi-recognition of the constituent Bosnian parties, clashing 
with each other. Step three – uneasy peace, sponsored by the ‘international 
community’, and involving as “mediators” the war lords themselves – Milosevic, 
Tudman and Izetbegobic have been the signatories in the peace, following their own 
war… Fourth step – Kosovo. The ‘international mediator’ Milosevic becomes 
indicted war criminal… Step five …? 
If we come back to the Kosovo case, the challenges of legitimizing an 
international action do not stop with the successful end of the NATO campaign 
against Belgrade. The comparison between means and ends and – in particular – 
between aims and results brings us to an environment of multiplying crises, stemming 
out of unresolved old dilemmas. 
First, the Kosovo action of NATO against Belgrade did not stop mass scale 
human rights abuse, even if it had successfully prevented a huge massacre of Kosovar 
Albanians, planned by the Milosevic regime. In the past nine months, systematic 
abuse of human rights of the now victorious Albanians over the minority Serbs has 
been taking place under the helpless observation of KFOR units, designed to perform 
military actions, but helpless in performing policing functions. The ethnic intolerance 
of Albanians in Kosovo affects not only the Serbs, yet all other ethnic communities – 
Roma, Turks, Slav Muslims etc. 
Second, the protectorate status of Kosovo resembles a contradictory structure. 
Kosovo is a legal part of Serbia, and Kosovo is practically separated territory with its 
own currency, border controls, customs, dependent on foreign donors and organized 
crime economy, aiming at full independence. Thus Kosovo represents an important 
test case of the unavoidable change of borders as a primary consequence of war. 
Europe resolved its ethnic clashes after the World War II on the basis of two 
interconnected principles: inviolability of borders and respect to minority rights. One 
could say – if Milosevic failed to observe minority rights in Kosovo, he would now 
face separation. Without going into too much detail – the separation of Kosovo could 
not remain a single case in the international system in the Balkan region and in 
Europe. If a minority succeeded once to receive its independence as a gift from the 
international community, many other minorities are very likely to follow this tempting 
lead. If Kosovar Albanians could become independent, what obstacle – in terms of 
reason or international law – could prevent the independence of the Bosnian Serbs 
and Croats? A potential independence of Kosovo would immediately affect the 
stability of neighboring Macedonia, opening in this way the entire Pandora’s box of 
old Balkan ethnic and nationalist strife. 
Separatism and international protectorate buffer zones against separatism are 
hiding one more evidence of long-term legitimacy shortage: the new structure of 
Kosovo - administrative and economic - does not promise easy recovery. The region 
is overwhelmed by the organized crime economy and politics, which function on the 
basis of adverse clan competition. No effective law and order could be installed in this 
entirely criminal zone, where nobody feels secure for his/her life or property. If the 
community and its international sponsors could not establish the basics of decent 
institutions in Kosovo, what could we count at for the future? The restoration of Serb 
control is impossible and unjust. The capacity for decent self-rule is almost non-
existent. How many years of international protectorate administration and how many 
billions of dollars could rebuild a legitimate order in Kosovo, thus preventing a crisis 
spill over into the Balkans? How many places like Kosovo do we have on the 
Balkans…? In Europe…? In the World…? How many cases like Kosovo do we face 
today…? And tomorrow…? The day after tomorrow…? 
Thomas Hobbs argued that no Leviathan (or reasonable order) is possible in 
the field of international relations. The process of international system’s development 
in the next centuries tried to prove this Hobbs' thesis wrong. The consent of sovereign 
nations upon particular principles, norms and values, has made it possible to 
distinguish (within a reasonable risk of relativism) between legitimate and illegitimate 
behavior at the international scene. How could we establish a legitimate new 
international system, if the universal rule of normative consent among sovereign 
nations is being replaced by the flexible qualitative considerations upon the human 
rights records of different states and regimes, selectively applied after the real politik 
interest of a current ‘international community’? (Flexibility is evident in comparing 
the Kosovo and Chechnya cases, where dealing with a ‘Great Power’ as Russia makes 
the only difference to dealing with the little nasty regime in Belgrade.) Human rights 
represent a value system. We either have to convince the entire world in a quantifiable 
normative version of our human rights observation standards, or we have to face an 
international system, built on relative bases. 
Legitimacy is a process of consensual empowerment, which makes it 
particularly difficult to develop international authority, enjoying legitimate influence 
upon a growing diversity of cultures (that is – diversity of values), intensely 
communicating in the global world. The motivation of the different actors, involved in 
the Kosovo crisis represents an illustration of this problem. 
 
II. The Kosovo crisis – the motivation of the actors. 
The actors in the Kosovo crisis seem to interact dynamically with each other, 
but this is only at the level of physical contact. At the level of value motivation to act, 
the participants often represent parallel universes with no relationship among them. 
Who are they, the actors? 
 
The Albanian community of Kosovo represents the passionate, emotional 
nationalism of a young nation, what Albanians really are. Like all young nationalists, 
Albanians try to enter the modern world of nation statehood, motivated by pre-
modern, primordial perceptions of the world. Albanians fight for land, and rely upon 
clan solidarity. Their blood tells them the truth about who is a friend or foe. They do 
not admit alien blood into their community. They live together in a collectivist 
extended family structure, where membership is subject to a sole criterion – proven 
origin. This is why Albanians do not live with ‘the others’. The aliens – that is the 
non-Albanians – have their own, non-intersecting territorial and spiritual realms. This 
is to explain the ethnic cleansing not only of the Serb foes, but also of all non-
Albanians from the territory of Kosovo, once after the Albanian community took over 
control with the KFOR presence. 
Serb nationalism shares most of the above mentioned features of the 
Albanian community, even if it is much older and on the defensive side. As former 
masters of the Yugoslav quasi-empire, Serbs have developed the art of assimilating 
other ethnic groups with violence or cultural sophistication. The myth of the Serb 
identity, though, is as primordial and organic as the Albanian claim for ethnic 
communal purity. The legendary prince Lazar, who preferred Heavenly immortal 
victory for the Serbs to the victory in the real battle against the Ottomans at Kosovo 
pole represents the transcedental legitimacy of the Serb claim of control over Kosovo. 
The Kosovo defeat in 1399 sanctified the Serbs into a heavenly nation and no 
authority on Earth could reclaim this holy background of Serb national identity. 
The Serb – Albanian dispute on Kosovo has the architecture of a medieval 
spiritual drama, where no compromise between the alternative parties seems possible. 
The global world with its new images and rules intervened in this drama in a really 
dramatic fashion. The leaders of the West represent a new international elite, whose 
perception of warfare has largely been shaped after the CNN imaging of the Desert 
Storm operation in the Gulf. ‘Human rights war’ has become possible, because it is a 
bloodless war. The ‘good guys’ are high in the sky and the ‘bad guys’ suffer 45 000 
feet below, where only the computer smoke of Star Wars-like explosions makes us 
guess how severe the punishment is. Those, who got punished for no guilt are isolated 
into the peripheral category of ‘co-lateral damage’, representing the unavoidable risk 
of life. This picture substantially reduces the psychological threshold to accept the 
war as a normal event or fact of life. 
In this context of ‘post-modern’ warfare Kosovo represented a low risk 
opportunity for the US President Bill Clinton to reclaim moral authority on the 
international scene, after having lost a substantial portion of it back home. Of course, 
we could not question President Clinton’s administration devotion to the human rights 
cause, which has been very actively manifested by the State Secretary Madeline 
Albright. Raised in a Czech family during the World War II, Ms. Albright’s 
passionate participation into the Kosovo campaign brought back to the political 
columns the forgotten notion of the ‘Munich Syndrome’. In 1938 the democratic 
leaders of France and Britain gave up the road to the still vulnerable Nazi dictator 
Hitler, permitting him to occupy Czechoslovakia and –later on – the entire Europe. 
The lesson of history, which Ms. Albright has learned on the example of her own life, 
is – ‘beat the dictator while he’s small’. 
European political landscape has been – and still is – dominated by leaders of 
explicit left-wing legacy at the time of the Kosovo crisis. Most of those European 
politicians have started their conscious political life as pacifist demonstrators or anti-
NATO campaigners in the Cold War era, when the successful performance of NATO 
has been crucial to the survival of the Western world. What has persuaded all those 
people, raised in the wave of 1968 culture, to support the NATO campaign against a 
brutal, but small Balkan dictator? How could Tony Blair and Xavier Solana present 
themselves as bigger ‘hawks’, compared to Jesse Helms or Henry Kissinger? We 
could offer many answers to those questions, but one of them is for sure true. The new 
generation left leaders of Europe are in search for their place in the history of 
unification and integration of the Old Continent. Schuman and Monet developed the 
idea of European unity. De Gaulle and Adenauer gave birth to the European 
integration as an expanding process. Miterand and Kohl mastered the Maastricht 
treaty, transforming the economic community into political, economic and social 
European Union. Now what is left for Blair, Schroder, Prodi and Solana is to achieve 
the EU enlargement and extend the values and principles of democratic, united 
Europe throughout the territory of the continent – even over the dark Balkans, which 
European legacy might be argued… 
This picture would be incomplete, if missing the attitudes of Russia and 
China. Suffering from its heavy post-imperial syndrome, Russia expressed authentic 
‘geopolitical anger’ at the NATO attack on the ‘Serb brothers’. Pushed back in its 
borders before Peter the Great, Russia was furious to see the Balkans – the last 
‘legitimate sphere of Russian interest’, and Serbia – the faithful Russian gendarme – 
attacked by the ‘wily West’. A defeat for Serbia should certainly mean cutting Russia 
off the Adriatic and dramatically reducing the remnants of Russian presence into the 
Mediterranean basin. 
China fully cashed the accident with its embassy in Belgrade. The Kosovo 
crisis was a truly legitimate opportunity to show up as a world power – a status 
Beijing will not be late to reclaim many times from now on. 
This small excursion into the motivation of the key actors of the Kosovo crisis 
explicitly shows the limits of legitimacy in an integrated international action, based on 
values with no clear normative consent behind them. If we tend to act on the basis of 
the purely value systems’ motivation, we have to face the ‘clash of civilizations’ 
paradigm. This paradigm may seem affordable from the perspective of a resident of 
Cambridge – Massachusetts, but it is certainly painful for the residents of the Balkans 
and many other regions of the world, where different cultures intersect and create 
environment of plural value systems. If the global world has to be a place of law and 
order, it should be governed by explicit rules of reason, capable to ‘translate’ values 
and interests into operational norms. Responsibility of observing those norms and 
rules should be claimed from the legitimate members of the international community. 
Do we consider it possible to replace national sovereignty with a plurality of actors 
into an increasingly relative world of global interaction? Can we consider entities as 
‘international civil society’ or ‘international community’ as structured and responsible 
enough to reclaim sovereignty from the ‘out-fashioned nation states’? 
No doubt – a new international system in the global world will represent much 
of the traditional clash of interest, much of the traditional relative value of 
international law interpretations, typical for the modern world. But if we stick to the 
tradition of reasonable translation of diverse interests into easily comprehensible 
consensual norms, equal for all international actors, then we have bigger chances to 
reproduce at least a relative law and order in the global village, where consensus upon 
values is not possible. Human rights respect – as we understand it - should be 
essential part of this ‘New World Order’, where we have to try to install it into the 
status of consensual norm. And the global sheriff should treat all violators equally – 
because this is the law. 
Within the upcoming new international system of the global world, the 
Kosovo crisis opens the door to optional tendencies of development in human rights’ 
status. This first ‘human rights’ war’ underlines the importance of respect for all 
human beings. It sends a clear warning to all dictators – present and future – about the 
end of their immunity to act against the international standards of humanity. At the 
same time, the Kosovo crisis and its aftermath have clearly shown the relative nature 
of international human rights concerns, the immature instruments of human rights 
defense within a controversial situation of tense inter-communal clash. There’s a 
danger in this immature ability to bring justice for all from the perspective of human 
rights defense. This is the danger of a growing number of people, believing that the 
notion of human rights reflects an idealistic value system, which is incorrectly used to 
disguise illegitimate hidden aims. 
 
